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Abstract—The remaining min-entropy of a secret generated
by fuzzy extraction from a Physical Unclonable Function is
typically estimated under the assumption of independent and
identically distributed PUF responses, but this assumption does
not hold in practice. This work analyzes the more realistic case
that the responses are independent but not necessarily identically
distributed. For this case, we extend the (n-k) bound and a tighter
bound by Delvaux et al. In particular, we suggest a grouping
bound which provides a trade off for accuracy vs computational
effort. Comparison to previous bounds shows the accuracy and
efficiency of our bound. We also adapt the key rank (a tool from
side-channel analysis) to cross-validate the state-of-the-art and
our proposed min-entropy bounds based on publicly available
PUF data from real hardware.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the demand for security in low-cost devices, Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) raised attention as a cheap and
still secure alternative for key storage compared to secured
non-volatile memory (NVM). PUFs utilize variations of the
manufacturing process. These variations cause unpredictable
and uncontrollable differences in the behavior of identical
circuits on different positions on a certain chip and on different
chips. The PUF response, a chip-unique secret which is not
permanently stored but derived by the PUF on demand, is
obtained from such differences. This work focuses on PUFs
comprised of multiple PUF cells, each contributing one bit to
the PUF response. The expected value of a chip’s PUF response
is fixed during the manufacturing process. Its value, however,
may vary between measurements due to noise, environmental
effects, and aging. Hence the PUF response cannot be used
directly as a key. The typical approach to obtain a key from a
PUF is to (i) measure the noisy PUF response, (ii) map it to a
noisy codeword of an error correcting code (ECC) by means
of helper data and a helper data algorithm (HDA), and (iii)
decode via ECC to derive a stable key.
The helper data may be stored unprotected and are generated
during a roll-out phase, usually in a code-offset fuzzy extrac-
tor [1] or fuzzy commitment [2] scheme. This schemes gener-
ate helper data ~y = ~x⊕ ~w by encoding a random k bit vector ~r
to an n bit codeword ~w and XORing an n bit PUF response ~x
to ~w. Depending on the scheme, the secret ~s, which is hashed
to the actual key, is either ~x or ~r. For performance reasons
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Figure 1. Relative frequency of 1 (Bit-Alias) for the PUF bits derived from the
dataset [4]. Squares reflect the positions of PUF cells (RO pairs) on a device.
the key is usually split into multiple chunks, so an ECC with
smaller message length can be used.
For the schemes and under the assumption of bias-free and
independent and identically distributed (IID) PUF responses,
the entropy of the key, when neglecting the hash, is limited
by k [3]. Most real world PUFs do not produce bias-free
responses, though; even worse: they do not even fit to an
IID assumption. Despite great efforts to design PUF cells for
unbiased output, incautious layout, unexpected influence of
adjacent logic, or small deviations in mask production can
already lead to biased responses. Because these effects differ
for each position on the die, the resulting bias is not identical.
An example is shown in Fig. 1. The heat map shows for
each cell of an RO PUF the relative frequency p for the
corresponding response bit to turn out as a 1 among all
devices in the dataset (i.e. the Bit-Alias [5]). The underlying
RO frequencies are taken from [4]; a response bit is derived by
mutually exclusive pairwise comparions between two adjacent
ROs in a row. Previous work shows that this approach produces
responses almost entirely free of spatial correlation [6], but
cannot remove the observable bias, which can be explained
by placement and routing [7]. Similar effects with varying
impact are frequently observable in PUF implementations.
An attacker who tries to reveal the key stored by a PUF
knows the helper data and the type of ECC. Thus, leveraging
the Bit-Aliases gives the attacker a significant advantage when
guessing the key. The effort for guessing the key in such a
setting might be approximated by guesswork and its relatives
[8]–[10]. But this is not feasible for the PUF setting due to
its high computational complexity. Another tool to bound the
quality of a key is entropy. Due to the cryptographic relevance,
only min-entropy is considered throughout this work.
Contribution: Estimation of the key entropy given known
helper data was previously studied in [1], [11]. However,
these works only cover the case of biased IID and unbiased
correlated PUF responses. This work first summarizes the
main achievements in the state of the art and demonstrates
the problems, which are caused when (i) not considering the
blockwise processing during post-processing, or (ii) assuming
IID instead of independent but not necessarily identically
distributed (IND) PUF responses. Several improvements upon
previous approaches are presented. In particular, we introduce
the grouping bound, which provides a practically feasible
bound of the conditional min-entropy of IND PUF responses.
All improvements are demonstrated using real world PUF data.
Additionally, the entropy estimates are compared to the key
rank, i.e. the actual effort for guessing a key.
Structure: After discussing the state of the art of entropy
estimation for PUFs in Sec. II, we introduce our improvements
in Sec. III. Results are provided and analyzed in the context
of key rank in Sec. IV. Sec. V concludes our work.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART ENTROPY ESTIMATION FOR PUFs
To evaluate the security of a PUF based key storage, the
conditional entropy of the PUF response ~x given the helper
data ~y is the important figure of merit. This section presents
state-of-the-art methods to calculate or bound the conditional
entropy, but first discusses entropy estimation of the PUF alone
as a necessary prerequisite.
A. PUF without Helper Data
Typically, response bits of PUFs are considered realizations
of IID Bernoulli random variables. I.e. each bit takes the
value 1 with probability p independent of all other bits. Under
this assumption, and given a sufficiently large number of
observed bits, if necessary from multiple devices, p is well
approximated by the relative frequency of a 1 in the data set.
Then the min-entropy m of a device’s n bit PUF response ~x is
m = H∞(X) = −n log2 (max (p, 1− p)) . (1)
However, as already pointed out in Sec. I, for many PUF
implementations the probability for a 1 differs significantly
between the positions on the die as shown in Fig. 1. This
contradicts the IID assumption so that (1) becomes imprecise.
Consequently, Wilde et al. [12] assumed the bits of the PUF
responses to be IND. In this case, the probabilities for a 1
form a vector1 ~p =
(
p1 · · · pn
)
, where pi is approximated
by the relative frequency of a 1 among the bits originating
from position i on the die. The min-entropy under the IND
assumption is
m˜ = H˜∞(X) = −
n∑
i=1
log2 (max (pi, 1− pi)) . (2)
The extent of the variation in entropy per bit, together with
the approximated entropy per bit under the IID assumption,
is depicted in Fig. 2. For most positions, the entropy under
IID assumption is severely overestimated compared to the
IND case, which sums up to 240 bit instead of 188 bit over
all positions, cf. Tbl. I. The root cause for the difference in
1All vectors in this work are row vectors unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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Figure 2. Min-entropy per bit for PUF response ~x under IID assumption and
for IND case. IID uses (1) without multiplication by n and with p =
∑
pi/n.
IND uses (2) without summation.
entropy estimates is visible in Fig. 1: Only few positions have
pi ≈ 0.5, while most positions suffer from either pi > 0.5 or
pi < 0.5, i.e. a bias towards 1 or towards 0. Both cases cause
a reduction in entropy m˜ according to (2). In the IID case,
however, p equals the average over all pi, which causes those
pi > 0.5 to partially cancel out with those pi < 0.5, resulting
in p being incorrectly close to 0.5 and overestimating entropy.
B. (n-k) Bound
Given the entropy of the PUF alone, an easy-to-compute
and frequently used, yet pessimistic, lower bound for the
conditional entropy of the PUF response given the helper data
is the (n-k) bound [1]. It applies only to the IID case, where
it calculates the entropy estimate l of an o bit key ~s by a
simple balance sheet: Ingoing to the fuzzy extractor are m bit
of entropy from the PUF response ~x and k bit of entropy from
a random number ~r that has full entropy. Outgoing are n bit
of entropy for the helper data ~y. An additional loss of L bit
occurs in the hash function that compresses the fuzzy extractor
output into a fixed length key.
l = m+ k − n− L (3)
Neglecting the hash function, the entropy loss between ~x and
~s is n− k, which gave the bound its name.
This approach can result in negative values for l, cf. Tbl. I,
because n−k is only an upper bound for the entropy loss that
holds with equality only if m = n [11].
C. Average Conditional Min-Entropy
Instead of the pessimistic (n-k) bound, Delvaux et al. [11]
provide a direct mathematical expression for the conditional
entropy based on the code-offset fuzzy extractor described by
Dodis et al. [13]. Evaluation is only feasible for small codes
[11], but it provides a baseline to compare the bounds against.
By application of Bayes’ rule to the average conditional min-
entropy definition in [13] they yield
H∞ (X |Y ) = − log2

 1
|R|
∑
~y∈Y
max
~w∈W
P (X = ~y ⊕ ~w)

 (4)
for an ECC in general and respectively the more efficient
H∞ (X |Y ) = − log2
(∑
~ǫ∈E
max
~w∈W
P (X = ~ǫ⊕ ~w)
)
(5)
for linear ECCs. Here R = {0, 1}1×kb is the set of possi-
ble messages of the ECC and Y = {0, 1}1×nb the set of
possible helper data generated for one ECC block. ~w is a
codeword from the codeword space W and ~ǫ an element of
the minimum Hamming-weight error vector space E such that
{~w ⊕ ~ǫ |~w ∈ W ,~ǫ ∈ E} = Y , i.e. ~ǫ is a coset leader.
Using a 3-repetition code as example, W = {000, 111} and
E = {000, 001, 010, 100}.
Equations (4) and (5) are not limited to block codes [11],
but in such a case, they are applied on a single ECC block
only. For the IID case considered in [11], it is sufficient to
multiply the result with the number of ECC blocks required to
produce the entire secret ~s to get an overall result.
D. Efficient Lower Bound for Average Conditional Min-
Entropy for Large nb
Because (4), (5) require up to 2nb |R| or respectively 2nb
operations, direct evaluation even for moderately sized codes
such as a (63,7,15) BCH-code is hardly feasible. Therefore,
[11] proposed an algorithm that reduces computational effort
via groups of PUF responses with the same probability, sorted
in decreasing order of probability, to avoid computations that
will later be discarded by the max operator in (4), (5).
Under the IID assumption, all 2nb responses can be grouped
into J = nb + 1 groups ϕj with probability
qj = q
j(1− q)nb−j (6)
where j ∈ [0, nb] and q = min(p, 1−p). Each ϕj then contains
|ϕj | =
(
nb
j
)
(7)
PUF responses ~x with probability qj and
qj > qj+1. (8)
This is useful because, for a given ~y, the max operator in
(4), (5) selects the most likely ~x that is reachable by addition of
a ~w. Therefore, and because ~r is chosen uniformly, |R| = |W|
elements of Y map to the same ~x as best guess, cf. Fig. 3.
E.g. for ~y = 100 and ~y = 011, ~x = 100 is the most likely ~x
within reach via ~w = 000, ~w = 111. It is thus sufficient to
consider 2nb/|R| (or 2nb−kb for block codes) elements of X
to accumulate the best guesses for all ~y ∈ Y .
Which 2nb/|R| elements of X to consider depends on the
specific ECC. For repetition codes with odd nb,
⋃t
j=0 ϕj , i.e.
the 2nb/|R| most likely ~x, are the correct choice, because due
to the IID assumption they either equal E for p < 0.5, cf.
Fig. 3, or, if p > 0.5, can be mapped to E by addition of
a fixed ~w. However, for a (15,5,3) BCH-code, in addtion to⋃3
j=0 ϕj , 420 ~x from ϕ4 and 28 from ϕ5 are required. By
instead choosing 448 ~x from ϕ4, thus again the 2
nb/|R| most
likely ~x, we overestimate the probability for 28 out of 1024 ~x.
Always choosing the 2nb/|R| most likely ~x thus provides an
upper bound for the sum in (4), (5), which leads to a lower
bound for H∞ (X |Y ) that holds with equality for maximum
distance separable (MDS) ECCs.
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Figure 3. Visualization of the algorithm from [11] using a 3-repetition code
and p < 0.5. The best guess – which is the one selected by the max operator
in (4), (5) – for every possible ~y can be found in the left half of the figure.
E.g. for ~y = 011, the best guess is to assume ~x = 100 thus ~w = 111, ~r = 1.
As qj is equal for all ~x in a ϕj , |ϕj | responses ~x can be
processed at once. Because |ϕj | often exceeds |R| already for
small j, this provides the most speed up, so that for a linear
(nb,kb,t) block code, t to t+ 1 computations suffice.
To summarize, this approach results in a much tighter lower
bound for the remaining min-entropy than the (n-k) bound and
is feasible in practice if the IID assumption holds.
III. IMPROVED BLOCKWISE CONDITIONAL ENTROPY
ESTIMATIONS FOR THE IND CASE
In this section, we present improved entropy bounds for keys
derived from PUFs. They are developed under the constraint of
practical applicability and consider that PUF response bits are
(i) IND rather than IID and (ii) usually processed blockwise.
A. (n-k) Bound
To bring the (n-k) bound to the IND case,m is to be replaced
by m˜ from (2). However, this only uses a better estimation for
the ingoing entropy from the PUF, while the entropy loss is
still at its worst-case. Hence the exact entropy according to (4)
is significantly underestimated, cf. Tbl. I, which might cause
overdesign and, therefore, high costs.
A tighter, yet very fast to calculate bound is found when
considering blockwise processing of PUF bits. The blocks are
independent of each other even in the IND case. Therefore, one
block cannot leak information about another and entropy can
be estimated per block. Fig. 4 shows the estimated entropy per
bit given pi values according to Fig. 1; bounds are calculated
for the complete PUF response under the IID and the IND
assumption as well as blockwise assuming IND and a 5-
repetition code. The actual entropy per block is obviously
bound from below by zero. Thus, the blockwise estimate of
the overall entropy is
l˜ =
Nb∑
i=1
max(m˜i + kb − nb, 0) (9)
where m˜i is the entropy in the PUF bits processed in
block i; the number of blocks for encoding a complete key
Table I
ESTIMATIONS AND BOUNDS FOR MIN-ENTROPY OF ~x AND FOR CONDITIONAL MIN-ENTROPY OF ~s FOR (N)-REP AND (N,K,T)-BCH CODES
(n-k) bound avg. cond. min-entropy Grouping, θ∆ =
n m m˜ k l l(m˜) l˜ IID IND 0.05 0.10
256 240 188
(3) 255 239 187 85 69.0 17.3 22.4 77.1 47.2 45.9 43.9
(5) 255 239 187 51 35.0 −16.7 3.30 45.1 22.5 21.7 19.6
(7) 252 236 185 36 20.2 −30.7 0.01 31.2 12.5 11.9 10.6
(21) 252 236 185 12 −3.78 −54.7 0.00 9.38 1.56 1.25 0.86
(7,4,1) 252 236 185 144 128 77.3 77.3 132 88.4 85.1 79.5
(15,5,3) 255 239 187 85 69.0 17.3 17.3 76.2 40.6 37.3 33.0
(31,6,7) 248 232 182 48 32.5 −18.1 0.00 NaN NaN 13.3 10.7
(63,7,15) 252 236 185 28 12.2 −38.7 0.00 NaN NaN 3.82 2.36
(127,8,31) 254 238 186 16 0.09 −51.6 0.00 NaN NaN 0.57 0.19
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Figure 4. Min-entropy per block for ~s for a 5-repetition code using original
(n-k) bound and improved version (9). For IID, i.e. using m in (3), l/Nb is
overestimated; l(m˜)/Nb is a too pessimistic bound. IND shows the entropy
estimate per block m˜i + kb − nb.
is Nb = ⌊
n
nb
⌋. Each block encodes kb disjoint bits from the
random number ~r, which is assumed to have k = kb ·Nb bits
of entropy, and contributes nb bits of helper data to ~y. Tbl. I
shows the improvement through the tightened bound for real
world data [4] and different codes.
B. Average Conditional Min-Entropy
Under the IID assumption, it is sufficient to apply (4) or (5)
on one block. The exact entropy in the key is then derived
by multiplying the result with the number of required code-
words Nb. To extend this exact approach to the IND case, we
compute the entropy individually for all Nb blocks, using the
accurately estimated probabilities in ~p to get P (X = ~ǫ⊕ ~w).
The entropies per block derived with (5) under the IID and
IND assumption are depicted in Fig. 5 and listed in Tbl. I.
Both show that falsely making an IID assumption severely
overestimates the remaining entropy, which puts the security
of the overall system at risk.
C. The Grouping Bound: An Efficient Lower Bound for Aver-
age Conditional Min-Entropy for Large nb
For the IND case, which is not considered in [11], no
two responses might have equal probability. If so, grouping
according to [11] ends up in 2nb groups ϕj with |ϕj | = 1.
Consequently, the final reduction from 2nb/|R| to t or t + 1
computations is no longer applicable, which makes computa-
tion infeasible for large codes. In the following, we propose a
new algorithm to calculate a strict lower bound (or optionally
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Figure 5. Min-entropy per block for ~s for a 5-repetition code using original
and blockwise average conditional min-entropy. As with the (n-k) bound, the
IID assumption severely overestimates entropy compared to the IND case.
an approximation) for the average conditional min-entropy for
the IND case in feasible time.
First, assume that for all pi in ~p
∀i : pi ≥ 0.5. (10)
Practically, this is achieved by setting each pi that violates the
assumption to 1 − pi and inverting the corresponding helper
data bit. Because H∞(p) = H∞(1− p), entropy is unaffected
and the entropy estimation obtained from the preprocessed
data holds for the original data. For the special case where,
after the transform, ∃0 ≤ pa ≤ 1 : (∀i : (pi ≈ pa)), which fits
for some SRAM PUFs [14], sufficiently accurate results may
be obtained under the IID assumption with p set to pa.
For the general IND case, though, a method is needed to
identify and calculate the probability of the 2nb/|R| most
likely PUF responses ~x efficiently. The key to this are large
response groups ϕj , because all ~x in a group ϕj can be
covered by a single computation. |ϕj | is strongly affected by
the number of unique values in ~p, because if some pi are
equal, the probability of an ~x only depends on how many, but
not which, of the corresponding response bits are flipped in
~x, creating a large number of ~x to be put into the same ϕj .
Due to the fast increase of the binomial coefficient, this gain
is already large for a small number of equal pi.
We therefore suggest to trade off accuracy against compu-
tational effort: The pi are collected in T bias groups ρτ such
that the difference between any two pi within any ρτ is at most
θ∆. All ητ pi within a group ρτ are assigned a representative
probability θτ and ~θ =
(
θ1 · · · θT
)
. The value of θτ may
be the maximum of all pi in the group to obtain a strict lower
bound for the remaining entropy, or some kind of average, e.g.
mean or median, to obtain an approximation of the remaining
entropy. Changing θ∆ trades off tightness of the bound against
computational cost, because it equals the maximum error made
by approximation of some pi and influences |ϕj | via ητ .
Independent of the chosen θ∆, all response bits have to belong
to exactly one bias group ρτ , thus
nb =
T∑
τ=1
ητ . (11)
After the transition from ~p to ~θ, the probability of an ~x
only depends on the number of flipped bits from each bias
group ρτ . Hence, a response group ϕj , which contains all ~x
with same probability, is uniquely described by the number
ζj,τ of bits flipped from each group ρτ or by a flip vector
~ζj =
(
ζj,1 · · · ζj,T
)
. Assume this vectors to be stored in a
J × T matrix
Zˇ =
(
~ζ′0 · · ·
~ζ′J
)′
, (12)
which is sorted according to (8). Transposition of a vector is
indicated in this work by a ′. The number of rows in Zˇ then
equals the number of response groups ϕj ,
J =
T∏
τ=1
(ητ + 1), (13)
and each group ϕj contains
|ϕj | =
T∏
τ=1
(
ητ
ζj,τ
)
(14)
PUF responses ~x with same probability qj . We summarize this
group sizes as ~ψ =
(
|ϕ0| · · · |ϕJ |
)
. Because of (10), the
best guess is ~x = ~1 =
(
1 · · · 1
)
, which corresponds to
~ζ0 = ~0, and
q0 =
T∏
τ=1
θηττ , (15)
which can be written in the log-domain as
ς0 = log2 (q0) = ~η log2
(
~θ
)′
(16)
using a scalar product of two vectors. Based on ς0, the log-
probabilities ςj of all response groups ϕj follow from
~ς ′ = ~1
′
ς0 + Zˇ
(
log2
(
~1− ~θ
)
− log2
(
~θ
))′
. (17)
To eventually bound the min-entropy, only the first Ω
elements from ~ψ and ~ς are necessary. Ω is the smallest j such
that
∑j
i=0 |ϕi| ≥ 2
nb/|R|. Due to (14), Ω < J ≪ 2nb/|R|.
Then the grouping bound is
H∞ (X |Y ) ≤ − log2
(
~ψ exp2 (~ς )
′
)
. (18)
The resulting bounds for several θ∆ and codes, even for
larger codes such as (127,8,31)-BCH, are listed in Tbl. I. Note
that when setting θτ to the lowest pi in a bias group ρτ , the
resulting estimate HL∞ (X |Y ) is no bound for entropy because
the algorithm still uses the 2nb/|R| most likely PUF responses.
However, for HH∞ (X |Y ) with θτ set to the highest pi in a
bias group, HL∞ (X |Y ) − H
H
∞ (X |Y ) is an upper bound for
the error made through the quantization of probabilities.
Remark: Until now we neglected to describe how to derive
the sorted matrix Zˇ , a task which is equivalent to computing
how many bits have to be flipped from the bias groups ρτ
for each of the 2nb/|R| most likely PUF responses. This is
a non-trivial task and falls into the category of integer linear
programming, which is NP-hard and would require to iterate
over J groups ϕj in the worst case.
However, a function2 can be written that, given a target
range of probability, returns the flip vectors ~ζj that result in
such a probability by recursion within the ρτ . Once sorted, the
returned vectors constitute a continuous part of Zˇ . The first Ω
rows of Zˇ can thus be assembled from repeated calls to the
function, starting with a target range from the probability of
the best guess downwards, adding the results for consecutive
target ranges until a sufficient part of Zˇ is obtained.
IV. VALIDATING ENTROPY BOUNDS WITH KEY RANK
The previous sections analyzed state-of-the-art methods and
explained our extentions for the IND case to estimate or lower
bound the conditional min-entropy of a PUF response given
the helper data. We claimed that because the state-of-the-art
tools only apply to the IID case, users are forced to take
this assumption, even if not justified, thereby jeopardizing the
security of the system due to a severe overestimation of min-
entropy. The corresponding results are summarized in Tbl. I.
In this section, we aim to validate these results by simulating
actual attacks on a code-offset construction using the 192
devices that constitute the dataset from [4], which has been
used throughout this work. We randomly chose 104 144 bit
keys (the maximum storable key length with the considered
codes on our device) and implemented them on each device,
using all codes mentioned in Tbl. I, to obtain corresponding
helper data. Because a device provides 256 response bits, only
k = kb⌊
256
nb
⌋ bits of the key can be stored for an (nb, kb, t)
ECC. Where k < 144, we used the first k bits of the key
and the first n = nb
k
kb
bits of the PUF response. The entropy
contained in these first n response bits (not given any helper
data) under the IID and IND assumption is reported in Tbl. I
in columns m, m˜. Given the helper data and the Bit-Alias ~p,
we determined the key rank for each key, device, and ECC.
The metric key rank originates from the field of side-
channel analysis. It represents the number of unsuccessful
guesses an attacker would make until the correct key is found
while following an optimal guessing strategy. To find the
optimal guessing strategy, one needs information on which
key hypotheses are more likely. In side-channel analysis, such
information results from e.g. measuring the electro-magnetic
emanations of a device while it performs a cryptographic
operation. For PUFs, the Bit-Alias provides such information.
2MATLAB code available at https://gitlab.lrz.de/tueisec/ind puf entropy
An attacker may obtain a sufficiently accurate estimation of it
by purchasing (as legitimate customer) a sufficient number of
devices from the same type and analyzing them in detail. To
calculate the key rank even for ECCs where 2k is infeasible to
enumerate, we use the method by Glowacz et al. [15].
Fig. 6 reports the logarithmic key rank in bit for each device
as a histogram for each ECC. The key rank depends on the
device, but not the key, because the guessing strategy aims at
the PUF response and once it is correctly guessed, the helper
data provide a direct mapping to the key. Vertical bars with a
cross indicate k, as 2k is the number of all possible guesses
for a k bit key. Vertical bars with a circle indicate the result
of the grouping bound for θ∆ = 0.05, i.e. a lower bound for
H∞(X |Y ). According to NIST, H∞ − 1 bit provides a lower
bound for average key rank if at most k∗ < k guesses are made
per device [10]. Hence an attacker must expect to require at
least 2H∞−1 guesses on average to find the correct key.
The validity of the bounds under IID assumption is already
falsified in Tbl. I by comparison to the exact average condi-
tional min-entropy with our extension for IND. Comparison
with the key rank shows that the (n-k) bound under IND
assumption is unpractically conservative. The results for our
grouping bound, however, are all safely below the average key
rank without being too conservative. This confirms that our
work provides a valid bound to assess the security of a PUF
based key storage using the common code-offset construction.
For the grouping bound itself, a trade off between accuracy
and runtime complexity is observable: Compared to the actual
average conditional min-entropy, where it is feasible to com-
pute, θ∆ = 0.05 provides the tighter bound. However, it also
requires a longer runtime due to the determination of the most
likely flip vectors ~ζj : For the computationally most expensive
case of a (127,8,31) BCH-code, the runtime on a commodity
computer is ≈ 20min for θ∆ = 0.05, compared to ≈ 10 s for
θ∆ = 0.1. In either case, our grouping bound is the tightest
bound under IND assumption that is feasible for large codes.
V. CONCLUSION
To verify the security of a PUF based key storage, the
remaining conditional entropy of the key is crucial. However,
current methods are either inaccurate or infeasible without
an IID assumption for the PUF response. Because the IID
assumption is not justified for many types of PUF, this work
proposes an accurate and feasible method to lower bound
the remaining entropy under less stringent IND assumption.
Results of applying the bound to different codes and for real
world data show the quality of the bound. The results also
demonstrate the relation between the bound and the average
key rank, i.e. the effort an attacker must expect for guessing
the key under an optimal guessing strategy.
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